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INTRODUCTION 
Private law proceedings, we are now well aware, are in 
clear contrast to public law proceedings in relation to 
the representation of children. The organisation and 
funding of such representation are currently under 
review but the principle that the child’s interests 
should be separately represented in proceedings that 
concern their upbringing and well-being is well 
established in public law proceedings. That principle 
is not established in relation to private proceedings 
generally. It is true that assessments of the child’s best 
interests occur through welfare reports; that the 
paramountcy principle operates; that the child can 
(with the leave of the court or if a solicitor decides she 
is able to act for a child) begin and defend or prosecute 
family proceedings without a next friend or guardian 
ad litem (GAL); that in exceptional circumstances the 
Official Solicitor may be appointed, and that s 64 of 
the Family Law Act 1996 may lead to regulations 
allowing for the separate representation of children in 
a new set of specified proceedings. Nevertheless, what 
these amount to in practice is that the independent 
interests of children are known and separately 
represented in only a small minority of cases.  
 The situation is not, however, as dire as that 
suggested by the (misprinted) title of an article on the 
front cover of the March 1998 edition of Seen and 
Heard (the NAGALRO journal): ‘Horse and carnage – 
the child’s solicitor’. The current debate, rather, is 
about the extent to which the possibilities for the 
involvement of children, or of their ascertained wishes 
and feelings, should be increased, especially in relation 
to disputes resulting from the separation or divorce of 
parents. In other words, by what procedures will more 
children be allowed to have their particular concerns 
and hopes presented to those making decisions about 
them – whether in court or in mediation?  
 But the issue is broader than this. I would argue 
that children are currently not ‘seen’ clearly in family 
proceedings and that, as a result, we do not know 
whether private law proceedings currently promote 
the child’s best interests: the real child is often 
invisible. 
 There are three main factors which have led to the 
invisibility of the real child. First, talk of a family 
justice ‘system’ (see Walsh Working in the Family Justice 
System – A Professional’s Guide (Family Law, 1998)) 
obscures the fact that the promotion of a child’s 
interests is usually the responsibility of one or two 
individual professional people at any particular time. 
However, the belief that there exists a system allows 
the assumption that somebody else in the system has 
responsibility and oversight. Secondly, talk about 
children has become too abstract: there is too little 
time and/or motivation to see what this particular 
child is like because of overriding presumptions about 
what is ‘good’ for children and what the ‘risks’ to 
children are. Such presumptions may be supported by 
research results at a general level but knowledge as to 
whether they apply to the child whose upbringing is 
the subject of dispute may not be sought. Thirdly, the 
exercise of parental responsibility is given priority over 
other aspects of the child’s well-being. The overriding 
concern is to allow the family, that is the two parents, 
the space to make their own arrangements. 
 Because of the assumptions inherent in the above 
three factors, the majority of children are not parties 
to, or the subject of, private proceedings. Family 
proceedings as such are not, therefore, important in 
addressing the best interests of most children where 
there are disputes about their upbringing and the local 
authority is not involved.  
 
THE EFFECTS OF ‘SYSTEMIC’ JUSTICE  
 
Divorce 
I will take, as a case scenario, the child whose mother 
wants a divorce and who, currently, is likely to go to a 
local solicitor. Clearly there are child related issues 
which could lead to family proceedings but who 
promotes the child’s best interests at this stage? 
Research previously reported in Family Law (Piper 
‘Ascertaining the Wishes and Feelings of the Child’ 
[1997] Fam Law 796) found that the requirement in 
the transaction criteria for firms franchised for family 
work relating to the wishes and feelings of the child 
caused solicitors difficulties. Solicitors basically asked 
the client what the child wanted. Some felt this was 
unsatisfactory but believed that if it ‘matters’, the 
child’s wishes and interests would be ascertained by 
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the court welfare officer.  
 The solicitor’s confidence is based on the assumption 
that ‘where it matters’ the court welfare officer would 
ascertain and convey the child’s wishes. The context 
makes clear that for them, as solicitors, the child’s views 
will ‘matter’ if there is a dispute that leads to a 
s 8 application. Their lack of concern is, therefore, based 
on a further assumption: that those cases which matter 
to them because they result in family proceedings are 
also the ones where it matters to the child that her views 
are ascertained to help further her best interests.  
 Therefore, there is no real screening at this stage to 
ensure that those cases where the child’s interests do 
need promoting by the family justice system actually 
become family proceedings. In relation to divorce and 
separation this is often not the case. The factors which 
push cases further into the family justice system are 
often the intransigence of the parental dispute and the 
availability of state or private funds to access family 
proceedings. Such factors may not screen in those cases 
where the child’s best interests are most at stake except 
on the basis of the presumption that intransigent 
parents are the worst thing that can happen to a child. 
 
Domestic Violence 
These same assumptions are evident in relation to the 
protection of children from domestic violence. There is 
no duty on solicitors to screen proactively for domestic 
violence, and a large proportion of the solicitors in the 
above research did not ask about domestic violence 
except in a context which will disappear – that of 
investigating the grounds for divorce and whether they 
would need to use ‘unreasonable behaviour’. Solicitors 
believed clients would tell them or they would ‘start 
getting a smell’ if violence and abuse had occurred. 
Indeed, a small minority explicitly rejected such 
questioning on the grounds of its intrusiveness, despite 
there being clear research evidence that those abused 
find it very difficult to disclose (see Kaganas and Piper 
‘Divorce and Domestic Violence’ in Day Sclater and 
Piper Undercurrents of Divorce (Ashgate, 1999)). 
Therefore, direct violence to children and the indirect 
abuse of witnessing it may not lead to proceedings. 
Even when s 1 of the Family Law Act 1996 is in force, 
the imperative to diminish or remove the risk of 
violence to parent or child in the divorce process may 
not have the desired effect if professionals in one part of 
the system continue to assume that somebody – the 
client or another part of the family or criminal justice 
systems – would have told them if it was ‘important’.  
 
Inter-disciplinarity 
It is taken for granted in all training and information 
texts on the operation of what is now called the family 
justice system, that those working within it should 
take a multi-disciplinary and inter-agency approach to 
problems and cases at all levels. 
 Such inter-disciplinarity has led to beneficial 
initiatives in professional training and collaboration: 
there are clearly advantages for different professionals 
to understand the information and evidence provided 
by those other disciplines which enable law to make 
decisions which are otherwise beyond its competence. 
But inter-disciplinarity has led to more than 
‘understanding’ other disciplines. Research would 
suggest there is a self-denying ordinance by lawyers to 
try not to ‘talk law’ and by judges not to judge (see 
Bailey-Harris, Davis, Barron and Pearce Monitoring 
Private Law Applications Under the Children Act: A 
Research Report to the Nuffield Foundation (University of 
Bristol, 1998)), and unwritten rules which deem as 
‘good’ the solicitor who wholeheartedly operates 
within a welfare discourse (Neale and Smart ‘Good 
and “Bad” Lawyers? Struggling in the Shadow of the 
New Law’ (1997) 19(4) Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 377, at pp 377–402). 
 Within the family justice system this has largely 
taken place without any theoretical discussion of the 
nature of the multi-agency and multi-disciplinary 
system which has been created. Inter-disciplinarity is 
of theoretical interest in other practical contexts; for 
example in relation to business management where, in 
the context of knowledge generation, there is 
discussion of the advantages, ethics, boundaries and 
drawbacks of such inter-disciplinary co-operation. An 
untheorised approach to the sharing of knowledge and 
professional practices has led, in the family justice 
system, to wide acceptance of particular and powerful 
assumptions about the child’s welfare which are now 
difficult to critique. Their disciplinary origins are not 
always clear and their relation to social research 
findings often dubious. It is now a brave or foolish 
person who says, in any gathering of professionals 
working in the family justice system, that contact or 
joint decision making can be ‘bad’ for the child. Yet it 
ought to be possible to say such things so that in 
relation to individual children that possibility can be 
investigated. There is a real danger that children’s 
interests cannot be promoted if we artificially limit 
our gaze by our presumptions about them.  
 
GENERALISED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT HARM AND 
RISK 
There are many assumptions about what is harmful 
and risky for children. Three, in particular, tend to 
obscure the needs of the actual child who is the 
subject of dispute.  
 
Children need ‘Sensible’ Parents  
What are currently presumed to be the biggest risks 
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to a child’s happiness and well-being are parental 
conflict and the lack of a continuing relationship with 
both parents. Those parents who co-operate with the 
other parent and who ‘sort out’ their family problems 
without outside help are assumed to be acting with 
common sense and taking the sensible approach to 
divorce. If parents are sensible in this sense it is 
assumed that they are acting in the best interests of 
their children. Without child abuse staring them in 
the face, no professional in the family justice system 
will see any need to investigate any further the 
interests of the child if faced by such sensible parents. 
 So issues about violence by one parent directed to 
the other, or issues about the quality of contact as 
opposed to the benefits of other activities which are 
forgone are not always of any priority. There is in 
some quarters almost a belief that one should let 
sleeping dogs lie on the assumption that questioning 
about such possibilities will only lead to disruptive 
allegations. So, potential concerns about child 
protection may be lost in the need to encourage 
harmony, agreement and smooth process (see Hester, 
Pearson and Radford Domestic Violence, A National 
Survey of Court Welfare and Voluntary Sector Mediation 
Practice (Policy Press, 1997)).  
 
Children are Harmed by the ‘Burden’ of Saying What 
they Want 
Solicitors we interviewed were rightly concerned not 
to put pressure on children by asking them their views 
in the presence of one parent. But the presumption 
that children are harmed by being asked is also one 
found in the approaches of court welfare officers and 
the judiciary. It is therefore a very influential 
presumption. The National Standards for Probation 
Service Family Court Welfare Work (Home Office, 1994) 
enjoin court welfare officers to see all children and 
‘Wherever their age and maturity permit it children 
should be offered the opportunity to express their 
wishes and feelings’ but research would suggest they 
are reluctant to do so because it is potentially a 
harmful ‘burden’ to children. Yet children are all 
different and some may be harmed by being ‘left out’. 
The case of Re C (Residence: Child’s Application for Leave) 
[1995] 1 FLR 927 was one precipitated by the belief 
of the 14 year old that, in the long history of 
proceedings between her parents after their separation, 
her views had never been properly communicated by 
the court welfare officer (at p 931).  
 
Court is a Bad Place for Children 
There is also a related presumption that engaging in 
court proceedings is very risky for a child’s emotional 
welfare and should usually not be allowed. For 
example the fear in relation to the separate 
representation of children in divorce, to quote the First 
Report of The Advisory Board on Family Law (Lord 
Chancellor’s Department, 1998), was that it ‘could 
drive a wedge between children and their parents, and 
make divorce proceedings more acrimonious rather 
than less’ (para 4.12). That belief has led the courts to 
be very restrictive in relation to applications for leave 
by minors. The positive benefits to flow from 
involvement in deciding one’s own future – evident in 
relation to at least one of the children interviewed in 
the research project at Leeds University – are assumed 
to be of little weight (see Neale, Wade and Smart ‘I 
just get on with it’: Children’s Experiences of Family Life 
Following Parental Separation or Divorce, Working Paper 
1 (Centre for Research on Family, Kinship and 
Childhood, University of Leeds, 1998)).  
 The presumptions above clearly reflect knowledge 
about what can be harmful to children and young 
people and it is difficult to argue that they are wrong. 
Yet the image of the child is very different in the 
youth justice system. The change of name from 
juvenile courts to youth courts (when the upper limit 
was raised by one year by the Criminal Justice Act 
1991) was both a reflection and an encouragement of a 
trend to rename as ‘youth’ those children who offend 
or are suspected of such – a trend which has 
culminated in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
Sections 8–16 of that Act are headed ‘Youth crime 
and disorder’ and what they deal with are parenting 
orders, local curfew schemes and child safety orders all 
of which relate to children under 10 years of age, the 
latter two exclusively: this is the way we have made 
children invisible in a different system and also, 
potentially, in those family proceedings courts which 
will be able to impose these orders on the under 10 
year old.  
 These particular children have been given a very 
different image in the discussions and documents 
preceding the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 from 
those images underpinning the assumptions about 
children in private proceedings. In relation to the over 
10s who will be dealt with in the criminal jurisdiction 
there is little concern about having children in court. 
They must be there and they must take responsibility 
for their wishes and actions – a responsibility that s 34 
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 assumes is there 
from the age of 10 when they are no longer deemed 
doli incapax. 
 Likewise, the new provisions in that Act relating to 
reprimands and warnings (replacing cautions) are 
based on the assumption that a career of crime can be 
nipped in the bud by frightening and punishing early 
instances of offending, an assumption based not only 
on assumptions about the deterrent effect of labelling 
and punishment but also on the assumption that 
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children have sufficient understanding of what 
constitutes their own good for them to make rational 
decisions to stop offending. In sentencing terms, 
therefore, there is a discount for age but little more.  
 It is almost impossible to reconcile these very 
different images of children, knowing as we now do 
the research evidence about the abusive background of 
children sentenced for grave crimes and the fact that 
victim and offender categories are so often conflated in 
real life. In addition, the interviews that Carol Smart 
and Bren Neale have recorded with children living in 
separated families (above) and also the comments of 
the research conducted by the Centre for the Study of 
the Child, the Family and the Law at Liverpool 
University (Lyons, Surrey and Timms Effective Support 
Services for Children and Young People when Parental 
Relationships Break Down – A Child-Centred Approach 
(1998)) would suggest that many children are very 
perceptive about what is happening and are able to 
make mature choices about family issues.  
 At the very least therefore we need to examine our 
assumptions about children in both systems so that 
each, different, real child is responded to without 
preconceptions about their vulnerability or their 
capacity for rational wrongdoing. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF CONCEPTS OF PARENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Parental authority – if parents are acting jointly where 
relevant – is sacrosanct. It underpins assumptions 
about the best interests of children and is crucial to 
particular constructions of harm and risk in relation to 
children. It consequently underpins particular ideas 
about good and bad parenting in the context of 
divorce. The separated-but-continuing harmonious 
post-divorce family which the Family Law Act 1996 is 
intended to promote is seen as important not just for 
the children of the marriage but also for their children 
and for society: 
 
‘If the children of today’s divorcing parents are to 
develop into well balanced adults, capable … of 
being responsible parents, then it will be desirable 
to ensure that their development is not weakened by 
the way in which the divorce process works’ 
(Consultation Paper (Lord Chancellor’s Department, 
1993), at p 16). 
 
 Only where parents are acting with sufficient 
irresponsibility to warrant – or potentially warrant – 
state intervention does parental authority not prevail. 
So, where there are care proceedings the child is 
allowed representation – the child’s wishes, feelings 
and welfare matter because parental responsibility is 
itself in question. In other circumstances – that is in 
private law proceedings – parental responsibility 
operates to obscure the child and her particular 
interests by being used to motivate parents to agree 
outcomes and to avoid the use of family proceedings. 
It is, in other words, used as a tool by professionals 
within the family justice system.  
 The transaction criteria (above) ask whether the 
solicitor has explained the legal and practical 
significance of the concept of parental responsibility to 
new clients. We asked our interviewees how they did 
that. Just under half of the solicitors reiterated 
‘definitions’ based on s 3 of the Children Act 1989 but 
most solicitors did not stop there. As one solicitor 
explained, ‘I don’t have one set approach – depends on 
what needs to be said’. Where the client was a 
non-residential father the explanation was tailored 
depending on whether he was perceived as a potential 
nuisance or not. So, a restricted idea of involvement was 
alluded to in the comments of those solicitors who said 
they tell clients who were, or would be, the ‘absent 
parent’ that the caretaking parent always makes all the 
‘normal everyday decisions’. Their imaginary talk to 
parents therefore included statements such as, ‘it’s not a 
charter to ring up mum every five minutes’ and ‘it 
doesn’t mean [you] can tell her what sort of breakfast 
cereal the child has’. If the solicitor thinks the client 
will be a ‘sensible’ absent parent, then the talk is in a 
wider non-legal language which seems to offer more: 
‘basically [I] convey the impression that they are both 
still involved and they can’t take, or shouldn’t take, 
unilateral action on important matters. There should be 
as much discussion and conferring as is possible’. 
 Solicitors were tailoring their explanations of 
parental responsibility with the aim of reducing 
conflict between the client and the other parent and of 
promoting what is deemed as the best interests of the 
child – that is the involvement of both parents in that 
child’s life. But the explanation of involvement was a 
limited one which never referred to the needs of the 
child. The welfare of the child is not centre stage; 
avoidance of a dispute is.  
 
CHILDREN IN PRIVATE LAW PROCEEDINGS 
The current debate about how the interests and the 
independence of spirit of children can better be upheld 
within private law proceedings is a very positive 
development but there is a danger that the solution 
will be seen purely in terms of new rules, different 
funding, increased use of mediation and a redrawing of 
professional boundaries in relation to family 
proceedings. These reforms may not lead to the 
changes desired if the current presumptions about 
harms and risks to children are so powerful that they 
hide any sight of the actual child and they make it 
difficult for actual children to hear what adults say 
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about them.  
 There is also a danger if arrangements are made for 
children’s interests to be better and more often 
ascertained and heard in family proceedings that they 
will be predicated on another presumption – that 
divorce is bad and that children will always be harmed 
by it and so need more representation. That is simply 
substituting one abstract image of children for another 
and pathological images of the children of divorcing 
parents are no basis for reorganising the family justice 
system. Indeed, if we continue to hold any one 
particular image of children, then the insights from 
research about differences between children and their 
needs will have no impact. 
 The task is to open up a range of possibilities for 
children to receive information and to be consulted or 
represented, both inside and outside the family justice 
system. Such a range of possibilities, what Lyons et al 
(above) refer to as an integrated policy, should be 
available for those individual children who will benefit 
by using them and to do that without strong 
assumptions about their competence, their 
vulnerability and their needs. These services need not 
be concentrated at the expensive court end of the 
system, nor, indeed, solely within the family justice 
system. 
 What is needed perhaps even more than particular 
changes to procedures and service, is a change of 
attitude to children. The recent formation of the 
National Youth Advocacy Service (NYAS), by the 
amalgamation of IRCHIN and ASC, has been 
accomplished with that aim in view. It hopes to help 
create a culture where children are listened to, clearly 
heard, and have, as often as possible, their views acted 
upon. This should not mean a vast expansion of the 
number of children being separately represented in 
court proceedings: research shows this is not what most 
children want, although some do. It would mean the 
opening up of possibilities for children – and not just 
the children of divorcing parents – to receive 
explanations about developments in their family life, to 
tell others their concerns and, where they are anxious to 
do so, to be involved in 
decision making. As parents and professionals we are 
going to find that difficult.  
 
This article is based on a paper given at the conference, 
‘Assumptions and Presumptions in Family Justice 
Thinking’, organised by the National Council for Family 
Proceedings, 9 December 1998, The Tavistock Centre, 
London. 
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